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Abstract: Sometimes the leaders of ethnic minority groups behave in a way that may promote
xenophobia. A simple two-subject model is used to find out when this behaviour is rational. The
conditions are briefly discussed with reference to the Italian case. An  appendix illustrates the definition
of xenophobia adopted in the paper.
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1.  Introduction: two examples.
In the Autumn 1999 Muslim people marched in protest in Turin. They were asking for women to be allowed to wear
the chador in the picture on the identity card. The point looked to many preposterous. Italian law allows for that, with the
only, and unavoidable, proviso that the subject  must be recognisable. Abuses by officials are very limited, and ways to
correct them, both formal and informal, are quite effective. It turned out that the march was set up by a relatively extremist
Minister, opposing a more moderate one for  leadership among the Muslim minority.
   At the end of 1997, the Council of the Assembly of Italian Rabbis ruled that "the conversion of minors to Jewish
religion will be considered only if their mother applies for conversion too
1". The President of the Assembly declared that
among the main purposes of the statement was to fight "a disturbing increase in mixed marriages
2".
   The two examples share five features. First,  in both cases ethnic authorities decided to do something that was
unmistakably bound to create difficulties to ethnic cooperation. Second, both initiatives imposed a  cost on ordinary
members of the ethnic community involved. Third, in neither case the decision was an answer to an initiative of the
authorities of the majority group. Fourth, in both cases the initiative was taken by the leaders of  non discriminated
minorities. Fifth, and possibly more intriguing, in both cases the action was very likely to be ineffective. This set of
common, and peculiar, features suggests that the two cases belong to the same family. Actually, I quoted the two examples
simply because they were  familiar to me,  without any particular research. I am confident that it is quite easy to find out
other ones, both in the press and in the literature. I label this type of behaviour XG-behaviour, or simply XGB, for
xenophobogenic - a neologism that means "suitable to produce xenophobia". But why does XGB occur? Both common
sense and history suggest that ethnic minorities gain from the absence of xenophobia, and usually try to minimize it. In
these cases, however, ethnic leaders (more: religious leaders, of  religions that preach for peace) adopted hostile behaviours
apparently "out of the blue", with no credible reasons for it, and with no serious hope for their objectives to be attained. So,
why?
   This paper tries to provide a (preliminary) answer. It is organized as follows. The next section will  lay down some
economic theory bricks.  Section 3 contains the model, and section 4 its analysis. Section 5 relates the findings to the real
world. The conclusions go back briefly to the theory. As there is no official definition of xenophobia, an appendix presents
the one that is (implicitly) adopted here.
                                                       
1 See Hakeilah, December, 1997; translated by the author (here and below).
2 Interview to Hakeilah, February 1998. Note that according to Jewish law a child belongs to the ethnic group of the mother, so there was
no room for an analogous requirement concening the fathers.3
2.  Theory: ethnic capital and xenophobia.
 The paper is based on two notions. The first is the theory of xenophobia  of Breton and Breton. According to Breton
and Breton (1995; see also Breton, 1999, and Breton 1964 for the basic model), xenophobia is instrumental to nationalism.
I will summarize the argument very briefly, thus admittedly missing a large portion  of the explanatory power of the model.
Ethnic leaders try to transfer goods, and especially property rights, to members of their ethnic group. This may be efficient
only by chance; if it is not, as in most cases, they  must  in some way compensate the members of their ethnic group who
end up loosing in the deal. These are the poor fellows doing the dirty job, and they will be paid through nationalist omens.
The Olympic games of 1936 and the soccer world championship of 1978 were a poor compensation for living in
authoritarian states - yet they succeeded to a good point. Now, for the trick to work people must be insulated from
information showing that other people may do better. Xenophobia does the job - people in country X fare worse, and if they
do better it is only because they are robbers, imperialists, infidels, or whatever. As will become clear, this paper may be
considered a case study of this theory. Actually, Breton (1999) writes: “I want to stress that the five building-blocks [that
define the theory] constitute a basic model and that it is the same model that is used to analyse all the human, social, and
political realities listed above as well as scores of others”.
   The second pillar  is the notion of ethnic capital. Several authors use it; I  will follow Wintrobe (1995, p.46)
3:
"Trust relationships like these
4 are capital. They yield a stream of future returns which are the profits on the exchanges that
trust makes possible  and that could not otherwise take place. [...]  Trust may be accumulated further if A and B trade with
each other, since trade provides opportunities to cheat, and therefore to forego cheating. However, the process is complex,
in that the "signals" being given can easily be misinterpreted. Consequently,  the process is simplified, and the costs of trust
formation are lower, when the two parties share common traits, such as common language, ethnicity, and so on." It follows
that (p.48) "in general, the optimal investment strategy [...] is truly complex. What the  individuals want is a mutual fund.
These funds exist, in the form of ethnic networks.
5" Ethnic groups work this way because they guarantee that the trust will
not be unduly exploited. It follows that the leaders of the ethnic groups are held responsible for the correct use of trust
capital: "ethnic leaders ("managers" of ethnic capital) can see themselves as accountable to history as well as to the current
membership and their interests (p.52)". I assume, as Wintrobe implicitly does, that the utility of ethnic leaders increases
with the quantity of ethnic capital that they control; it follows that they are likely to oppose  someone who tries to replace
the ethnic capital with other  relationships accomplishing the same function. Ethnic capital has some other very interesting
features, for instance it is bought by the family and, most important, it is not (easily) transferable; however, these features
are not relevant here. Note that the notion of ethnic capital is strongly grounded in empirical research
6, as well as in basic
theory
7.
  The notion of ethnic capital yields the symmetric notion  of non ethnic capital. Broadly speaking, ethnic capital is
made of trust relationships, and its services are the share of production that may attributed to it. It follows that non ethnic
capital, i.e. trust relationships established across ethnic boundaries,  is capital too. This kind of asset is likely to be more
volatile, more expensive and less productive than the ethnic one, yet its nature of capital cannot be denied without rejecting
the notion of ethnic capital too. It is crucial for our model.
                                                       
3 See also Congleton  (1995).
4 Wintrobe refers to trust between buyers and  sellers knowing each other.
5 For the purpose of this paper, ethnic network and ethnic group are equivalent. The last quotation has been slightly changed for insertion
convenience.
6 See for instance Borjas (1992), who relates the performance of individuals to the quality of the ethnic group they were grown in.
7 Think for instance of the theory of the enforcement of cooperation-inducing conventions (a classic is Axelrod, 1986).4
3. The model.
There are two subjects, a typical subject, S, who is a member of an ethnic minority group dwelling amidst a larger
majority group, and an ethnic leader, L,  who is a leader of the minority ethnic group. Here follows the model.
Utility of S:
(1)  U(S) =  Y – C = MP[Xi
d(i)]Ke
aKn
b - B° - B
(2)  ceKe + cnKn = B
(3)  S(ciXi) = B°
S wants to maximize a profit, the difference between the values of production and expenditure. Y is the product (in
value units). I assume a quasi - Cobb Douglas production function because its parameters may be given an easy-to-read
meaning, and because of a formal property that will prove useful
8. Xi is a normal production factor, like labour; Ke and Kn
are ethnic and non ethnic capital, as defined above. There are two budget constraints: B° refers to usual factors, and B to
ethnic and non ethnic capital. The first one needs no explanation. As for the second, S may spend a night in the church, thus
accumulating ethnic capital, or at the meeting of the Inter-Ethnic Workers' Union, thus accumulating non ethnic capital; yet
he/she cannot be in both at the same time. c figures are obviously costs. Note that a and b, being elasticities, are almost
assuredly <1. The price of the product is included in M. A little algebra yields the equilibrium values, that I label with a
star:
(4)  Ke * = aB/[ce(a + b)]
(5)  Kn * = bB/[cn(a + b)]




The last expression may be summarized into
(6') Y*  = AKe*
aKn*
b       where A = MP[Xi*
d(i)]
Note that (because of the form of the production function) the equilibrium quantity of a factor is not affected by the
price of the other one.
Utility function of L:
(7) U(L) = rY + tKe- sKn
L receives a tithe, a share of the revenue of  S; r both defines this share and transforms it into utility. In addition, L
prefers S to avoid using non ethnic capital.   t and s are parameters, both > 0. To better understand eq. (7), it is useful to
specify what c(.) and K(.) are intended to mean in eq. (2). If K(.) is a production factor, it cannot be measured through its
production; hence K(.) corresponds by and large to a quantity of relationships - something like the "number of friends",
weighted with the soundness of the friendship. It is easier to define  c(.), even if actually measuring it could be more
troublesome: it is the opportunity cost of acquiring a unit of friendship,  something like "the time devoted to public
                                                       
8 It could be of some interest to assume a CES production function for Y, as it allows to consider the effect of a change in the  elasticity
of substitution between Ke and Kn. A further version of the paper will be hopefully devoted to this.5
relations". Now, the more S uses non-ethnic capital, the more he is likely to follow two paths that may be harmful to L.
First, he will oppose the payment of the tithe, as he becomes more secular with respect to the group traditions; second, he
will change his production so as to require less ethnic capital. All these features will become appreciable only in subsequent
periods; to avoid a  cumbersome dynamic model, we may suppose that their present-value expected effect is summarized
by s.
   Now we are in condition to state the basic assumption of this paper, as follows: the ethnic leader may adopt XGB,
i.e. may promote (a little) xenophobia against the members of his/her own ethnic group. XGB may be useful for L because
it makes it more difficult for S to use Kn. In our model, this result appears as an increase in  cn:   the same quantity of
interethnic  trust costs more.
4. Comparative statics.
From (7), and remembering that in equilibrium the expenditure for a factor is not affected by the expenditure for the
other, we obtain the value of Kn (used by S) optimal for L, that will be labelled Kn°:








(9') D = Kn* - Kn°  =  bB/[cn(a+b)] – (brA/s)
1/(1-b){aB/[ce(a+b)]}
a/(1-b)
Is the difference between the real equilibrium value of Kn, i.e. the one chosen by S, and the value desired by L. D
needs not be positive - if it is negative, L would prefer more non ethnic capital to be employed by S. This case is not of
interest here. If it is positive, however, L may reduce Kn* through XGB, as an increase of cn reduces Kn*.
I assume that the larger D, the greater the incentive for L to adopt XGB. The next step is to check for the conditions
that make D large. A little computing shows that ceteris paribus D is large when
a) s is high;
b) A is low;
c) cn is low;
d) ce is high;
e) a is low;
f) r is low.
Note  that conditions c) and e) imply that ceteris  paribus Kn* is high.6
5. Back to the real world.
 The case of interest for us is when D is actually high, To keep the discussion simple, let us suppose that all
conditions  are satisfied. In the real world, this is the case of an ethnic minority that  assigns an important role to ethnic
leaders  (condition a), is relatively poor (b), and lives in a non-discriminating environment (c). Conditions d) and e) add
something interesting: trust relationships within the ethnic group are costly, and ethnic capital is poorly productive. This
may correspond to a situation where the ethnic network is not dense, possibly due to an ongoing process of integration or to
a large influx of new migrants, or to both. Finally, condition f) speaks of a community where the tithe is low - the income
of the ethnic leader is weakly linked to that of ordinary subjects. The resulting picture reminds the case of several ethnic
groups in Europe, including Italy. For instance, many Islamic minorities are of recent immigration, and flows are very large
and erratic (which explain conditions d) and e); their members live in a (to a point) non discriminating environment (c),
they are poor (b),  traditional and religious values are very important (a), but the fees for the Church are very limited, at
most. By contrast, the Chinese in Italy are numerous, yet they are very mimetic, and never engage in XGB. This may be
explained by the fact that they are relatively well off, ethnic networks are dense, and possibly religious values are less
important for the ethnic leadership and there is a sort of taxation within the community
9.
   A final point deserves some attention. Consider the derivative of the utility of the typical subject with respect to
the equilibrium level of Kn:




where R stands for all the fixed-value quantities (remember that b<1).
To put it simply, the absolute value of this derivative is low if Kn* is high. But if the derivative is small a reduction
of Kn is of little harm for S. And we saw that when D is high, i.e. when the incentive for L to reduce Kn is high, Kn is
typically high. This implies that under the conditions outlined above S is likely not to oppose too much a reduction of Kn.
6. Conclusion and caveats.
The set of conditions that promotes XGB looks quite specific, even if not too special. Actually, XGB is not that rare,
yet not very common. An empirical enquiry to test for the presence of conditions a) to e) in cases of XGB could be of real
interest. However,  the model has at least two serious limits.
First, the use of a Cobb-Douglas production function  simplifies very much the computing, as we saw; and allows
for interesting simulations, due to the readability of the parameters. But, as we noticed, it does not allow  to consider the
elasticity of substitution between the two kinds of capital, while it  could be relevant. Second, and  more important, the
model does not consider the costs of a reduction of Kn, both for L and S. A third limit, albeit more apparent, is less harmful.
This is the exclusion of second, and further, round effects of XGB. The consideration of these rounds may be supposed to
be included in the parameter s. However, it could be of interest to consider under which conditions the risk of a spiralling
xenophobia is relevant. If ethnic leaders are rational, in these conditions XGB should be absent. Finally, two further pieces
of theory deserve to be referred to, even if they are not necessary for the development of the model. Iannaccone (1992)
noticed that some religious weirdness may accomplish just the same function of XGB, i.e. to make it difficult to entertain
normal relations with the infidels. More important, the basis of this model is the usual coupling of a principal-agent
                                                       
9 The case of the Jews is interesting. Jews in Italy used to be very well integrated. However, in recent years there has been, and there is, a
relatively large inflow of migrants  from Eastern Europe and the Middle East, mostly to Roma and  Milano, the two largest communities.
This may explain substantial changes in attitude.7
problem with asymmetric information. Now, Landa (1988) claimed that ethnic networks have the dignity of a third typical
form of organization, in addition to firms and to bureau-like hierarchies. If this is so, the model of this paper, and more
generally the family of models derived from Breton, occupy the same niche as the models derived from Williamson with
reference to firms, and those derived from Niskanen with reference to bureaux.8
APPENDIX - A suggested definition of xenophobia
   Let X and Y be two ethnic groups, x˛X, y,i˛Y three typical subjects, and A a set of actions (or behaviours) that i
thinks that may be applied to x and y.  a˛A  is an action (or behaviour) xenophobic for i towards x if
(1) dU(.)|a < 0
(2) ¶Ui/¶Ux|a < 0
(3) ¶Ui/¶Ux|a  > e > ¶Ui/¶Uy|a
In words, for a to be a xenophobic action for i towards x we need three conditions. First, a must be harmful to x.
Second, i must draw some positive utility from the loss of utility of x. Third, the positive utility for i must be significantly
greater than in the case that a is applied to y.
The evaluation assigned by i to the increase in her/his utility, (¶Ui/¶Ux|a)dUx|a is the xenophobia of i towards X
relative to a; the sum of such evaluations across  all a˛A such that conditions (1) to (3) hold is the xenophobia of i towards
X relative to A, or simply the xenophobia of i towards X.
It follows that:
(a)  xenophobia has the same nature of ofelimity - the perception of the utility of something. As such, it may be
measured through a continuous variable, call it X
10. Most people probably have a very low, yet positive value of X
for some ethnic groups; some, hopefully few, a high or a very high value. However, the definition suggests to
think of the level of xenophobia - not of its presence or absence.
(b)  for a to be a xenophobic action for i towards x, i is not required to be the subject who implements a.
(c)  more important, for a to be a xenophobic action for i towards x it is not necessary that a be accomplished at all. A
person who would like members of a given ethnic group to be harassed is xenophobic even if they in fact are not.
(d)  If we change some signs, we obtain the definition of the opposite feature - xenophilia.
(e)  The definition aims to correspond to the common-sense notion - a subject is deemed to be xenophobic if he/she is
happy when a black, a Jew, etc. suffers due to a given action. However, with respect to common sense it inverts
the causation. The utility of a given group being damaged produces xenophobia, while often we  tend to think that
xenophobia is the prime cause of the harassment of ethnic groups. This point is by no means obvious, as it rules
out  from the economic approach all kinds of genetic or imprinted xenophobia. To be clear, this cannot exclude
the existence of this kind of xenophobia; more simply, it is excluded from an analysis based on the assumption of
rational behaviour. In the same way, non-rational behaviours exist, but they are not studied by economics. In my
opinion, non rational xenophobia is a rare and not so relevant phenomenon; but this is another story.
                                                       
10 The continuity of xenophobia is assumed also by Breton and Breton (1998) and by Ortona (1984).9
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